The Ravens Warband

The defence of the Anglo-Saxon state: from the Treaty of Wedmore to the Battle of Hastings

Introduction

In his introduction to ‘Gregory’s Pastoral Care’ King Alfred [1] identified that a king who ‘obeyed God and his messengers … not only maintained their peace, morality and authority at home but also extended their territory outside; and they succeeded both in warfare and in wisdom’[2].  It is in this inclusive sense that I use the term defence [3], to mean not only warfare conducted against an aggressor, but also offensive warfare explicitly for the purpose of territorial expansion.

The term Anglo-Saxon has recently been preferred for the 5^th – 8^th centuries, while Late Saxon / Viking was identified as being preferred for the 9^th – mid 11^th centuries [4].  I am however using Anglo-Saxon to include the period 878 AD to 1066 AD [5].  I am using the term State [6] to encompass ‘the form of government and constitution in a country’ [7] and ‘the rulers, nobles or great men of a realm; the government, ruling body, grand council or court’ [8].

I shall be examining the defence of the Anglo-Saxon State thematically, from the conclusion of the peace agreement between King Alfred and King Guthram at Wedmore, to the loss of the ruler and many of the nobles and great men of the realm at the battle of Hastings. The themes that I shall be examining are:

·        The norms of war;

·        Frið [9] and Unfrið [10];

·        Weallstilling [11];

·        Brycggeweorc [12];

·        Fyrdstemn [13];

·        Scipfyrd [14] and Sciphere [15].

The norms of war 

In seeking to define the Anglo-Saxon norms of war, it is first necessary to review the pattern of warfare prior to the Viking [16] invasions, and then to examine the extent to which these patterns changed in response to a changing situation.  In examining the pattern of Anglo-Saxon Warfare from 600 – 850 Guy Halsall (1989) identified that each kingdom fought a major war once per generation [17], lesser battles once every six years [18], and were involved in ritualised expressions of violence [19] including raiding activity every year except in times of strictly enforced peace [20]. Harrying was used to establish dominance [21] and payment of geld and the exchange of hostages were recognised means of getting out of a tight spot [22].  A force engaged in defensive actions was referred to as a fyrd an offensive or raiding force as a here [23].

The following may, in Anglo-Saxon terms, be identified as different or unfamiliar about the way that the Vikings practised war:

·        The use of ships to unexpectedly arrive and leave [24];

·        Attacks upon monasteries [25] for wealth [26] and horses [27];

·        The intensity of harrying [28];

·        The intensity of battle [29];

·        The resultant rapidity of change to the political scene [30].

Once the Vikings settled, warfare rapidly assumed a more ritualistic form, with greatly reduced intensity and more tightly regulated peace.  During the 10^th century this was paralleled across Western Europe by a ‘peace movement’ championed by the church, although nowhere was it as successful as it was in England [31].

Frið and Unfrið

The unparalleled violence and spectacular success of the micel hæðen here [32] came to an end with military defeat at the battle of Edington (878) followed by pursuit to Chippenham [33], and the spectre of starvation in defeat [34]. Asser notes that ‘when they had been there fourteen days the Vikings, thoroughly terrified by hunger, cold and fear, and in the end by despair [35], sought peace. [36]’ King Alfred ‘was moved to compassion’ and after taking hostages and oaths received Guthram their king to baptism and received him as his adoptive son at Wedmore [37], so was concluded the Frið [38].

Subsequent to the peace at Wedmore a treaty was agreed between Alfred and Guthram, defining the accepted border of Guthram’s East Anglian kingdom [39]. The treaty sought to equably adjudicate against cross border violence and theft [40]. The only other example that we have of Frið relates to 991 or 994 [41], and indicates similar concerns 42]. These are best understood from the perspective of a young warrior’s training in which by tradition crime in another kingdom had not been regarded as punishable in one’s own [43].  Young warriors had traditionally learnt the warrior’s skill through slaying and raiding away from home [44], in the interests of peace this was no longer to be so [45].  While some of the necessary skills could be learnt at the hunt [46], this was a long way from the thorough curriculum in individual courage and small unit tactics that low level violence between the kingdoms had previously ensured.

Weallstilling

Having gained peace at Wedmore, Alfred and his advisors prepared for war.  Keen interest was shown in the movement of Viking here abroad [47], meanwhile measures were taken to counter the Vikings on their expected return.  Key amongst these measures was the repair and construction of burh [48].  Alfred’s burh had three main functions:

·        To deprive the Vikings of their operational mobility [49];

·        To act as a focus for local defence [50];

·        And to provide an emergency reserve of operationally deployable troops [51].

The burh enabled Wessex to be defended, and as Mercia fell under the sway of Wessex so the system of burh was extended[52].  Under Edward the Elder burh were also used in the offence:

·        To indicate an interest in territory[53];

·        And serving in a role analogous to that of a Medieval siege castle[54].

There is some evidence that the larger burh, which along with their smaller neighbours had originally been constructed with rapid techniques [55], were subsequently faced with stone [56].  As a result of the long peace in the mid C10th the defences of many of the burh had been encroached upon [57], or were otherwise in disrepair.  The early C11th saw the construction of a number of smaller, private burh [58].  Only in 1055 does ASC again mention repair of a larger burh, at Hereford [59].

Brycggeweorc

From the middle of the C8th Brycggeweorc had been one of the three common burdens reserved by the king in his charters [60], along with Weallstilling and Fyrdstemn [61].  In the Laws of Cnut, a fine was introduced for those failing to honour their responsibility in this regard [62].  Bridges enabled the rapid movement of people and goods in all weathers [63].  Fords may also have been maintained as an aspect of Brycggeweorc [64].  It appears that the maintenance of bridges and fords may have been closely associated with Burh [65].

Bridges and fords both enabled movement and canalised it.  Each had their dangers in poor weather, while fords could be impassable at certain times of day or at certain times of the year. If the structure of the old Rochester Bridge, based upon Roman piers may be regarded as typical, then it is interesting to note the removable section of bridge at the city end [66].  Other bridges are known from Late Saxon times [67].

Bridges not only enabled movement by land but could be used to block movement by water.  A Kentish charter of 811 first records the use of a bridge in this role [68].  The earliest usage of a bridge on the continent to block riverine movement is recorded in the reign of Charles the Bold across the Seine at Pont de l’Arche in 862 [69].  King Alfred used this method in 895 to block the river Lea [70].  In 1016 Cnut was forced to dig a passage to the south of London Bridge so that London could be besieged [71].

Fyrdstemn

Abels identified two forms of fyrd raised under King Alfred, mobile standing armies raised in two separate parts, and provincial forces which under Alfred appear to have been based on the burgware [72].  While mobile forces continued to be raised under Edward the Elder and Æthelstan, there is no evidence for English troops being raised during the peace that lasted until 980.

Leadership was assumed by the King (with the exception of Æthelred and Edward the Confessor who often delegated their authority), Ealdorman and later Earl [73], and also the King’s ðegn [74].  In time of war, selection for office was at least in part based upon martial skill.  In the emergent peace following Alfred’s reign selection was more as courtier than as military men [75].

With the decline of the military role of the burh, the provincial force had to be separately raised [76], and were no longer immediately available when required [77].  The standing forces were not practised, and the leadership were in general not military men [78].  The requirement for one mailcoat and one helmet to be produced from every 8 hide in 1008 [79] also suggests a lack of arms.  Without skilled leadership, adequate equipment or trained men there was little choice but to buy peace until skill at war could gradually be re-learnt [80] .

Under Cnut huscarl were added to the Anglo-Saxon military scene and Danish lið were maintained until Edward the Confessor’s reign [81].  The capacity to raise mobile standing forces re-emerged [82] and a low level of war [83] acquainted troops and leaders with skill at arms.

Scipfyrd and Sciphere

In 850, a Kentish Scipfyrd had struck a great raiding army at Sandwich, captured 9 ships, and put the others to flight [84]. Alfred and subsequent kings attempted to emulate this success, but as Rodger explains true naval warfare did not exist, and no absolute command of the sea was possible, the inability to effectively scout being one of the main limitations in the defensive application of naval power [85] .  While some focus on the ships that Alfred [86] and later Æthelred ordered to be built [87], the strictly limited success of their defensive endeavours at sea is the more striking fact [88].

What did in general work were combined operations [89], with mutual support between land and sea, such as that used by Æthelstan against the Scots in 934 [90] and Earl Siward against the Scots in 1054 [91].  What also worked was the use of the tactical and strategic surprise that attack from the sea gave, such as that argued to have been used by Edgar’s Viking mercenaries in the Irish Sea [92], termed a Sciphere [93].  The two methods were successfully combined in 1062-3 when Earl Harold and Earl Tostig launched separate but co-ordinated strikes against King Gruffydd of the Welsh, resulting in Gruffydd’s death [94].  The poor weather in 1066, which almost prevented William of Normandy’s expedition, prevented combined operations being used in the defence when having waited so long for William the ships and fyrd had to be dismissed for lack of supplies [95].

Conclusions

On October 14^th 1066 Harold II and those who wanted to support him, the embodiment of the Anglo-Saxon State, died on Hastings Field [96].  In the 870’s Alfred had come close to a similar fate, as Asser says it was the loss of so many good men that had been hardest to bare [97].  Nor had William easily rested the crown, on three separate occasions William had been unhorsed [98] , Harold fell only once [99], but he fell dead [100].

Alfred placed his faith in God [101] and preparation for war [102].  With the rise of the peace movement [103], and the resulting loss of skill at arms faith was in effect being put in God alone [104].  Under Æthelred skill at arms was slowly re-learned, and Edmund achieved an honourable peace [105].  Thereafter low-level war was maintained, the State thus being in readiness in case of serious threat [106].

Prior to the Frið at Wedmore the Anglo-Saxon State had been bought to very low ebb [107].  Alfred’s greatness may be measured by his magnanimity in victory [108].  The military measures he took were in general not new [109] but were in most cases appropriately applied to the circumstances at the time.  Only in the way that he attempted to use naval power did Alfred appear mistaken [110].  All kings used payment of geld when they needed to [111], but Æthelred was rebuilding the military from a very low base [112].  In subsequent years the military regained its former efficiency, as evidenced by successful expeditions to Scotland and to Wales [113].  In 1066 the Anglo-Saxon State fell in a very close run fight [114].

Notes

1. In accepting the translation of 'Gregory's Pastoral Care' attributed to King Alfred as King Alfred's work I am following Keynes S and Lapidge M 'Alfred the Great' Penguin Books (1983) pp 28, and the authors acknowledged by Keynes and Lapidge in note 27 on page 214.
2. Keynes S and Lapidge M (1983) Ibid. p124.
3. The word defence came into the English language from Old French 'defens', itself deriving from the Latin 'defensum'. As such the use of the term defence could be viewed as anachronistic. Defence is first known to have been used in the sense of 'guarding or protecting form attack' in 1297, and in the sense of 'keeping off or resisting the attack of an enemy' in 1400 ('Oxford English Dictionary' (OED) Vol. III D-E Oxford at the Clarendon Press (1933) pp129). There is no single Anglo-Saxon word that has been identified to embody the concepts of maintaining authority at home and extending territory outside as aspects of warfare. That these concepts occur together in one of the books 'which are most necessary for all men to know' (Keynes S and Lapidge M 'Alfred the Great' Penguin Books (1983) p 126) does however identify that they were thought of as being associated during the period under discussion.
4. Chronological conventions identified in the 'Editor's Note Medieval Britain and Ireland in 2002', Medieval Archaeology, 47 (2003), 199-200.
5. Here I am following the usage of the scope of the term Anglo-Saxon made by Stenton F 'Anglo-Saxon England' Third Edition Oxford at the Clarendon Press (1971), and Campbell J [Ed.] 'The Anglo-Saxons' Penguin Books (1982) amongst others.
6. From the Latin 'status' OED Vol. X Sole - Sz Oxford at the Clarendon Press (1933) p 849.
7. First recorded in 1538 (OED Ibid. p 852).
8. First recorded in 1581 (OED Ibid. p 852).
9. Agreed terms, (which) generally … stipulated a payment to the Vikings as well as arrangements for their provisioning during the winter (Lund N ‘Peace and Non-Peace in the Viking Age – Ottar in Biarmaland, the Rus in Byzantium, and Danes and Norwegians in England’ Knirk J E [Ed.] ‘Proceedings of the Tenth Viking Congress: Larkollen, Norway, 1985’ Oslo (1987) p256.
10. ‘Hostilities’ or ‘absence of peace’ … (E.g.) Anglo-Saxon Chronicle … 1001: Her on Þysum geare wæs micel únfrið ón Angel cynnes londe … (ibid. p256).
11. The repair of walls (Clark Hall J R ‘A concise Anglo-Saxon dictionary: 4th Edition’ University of Toronto Press London (2000) p399). This term is recorded only in the Burghal Hidage and is discussed by Dodgson J McN. ‘Appendix I: OE Weal-stilling’ in Hill D & Rumble A R [Ed.] ‘The defence of Wessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon fortifications’ Manchester University Press (1996).
12. Work of building or repairing bridges (Clark Hall J R (2000) Ibid. p58).
13. Literally army (fyrd (Clark Hall J R (2000) Ibid. p144) or fierd (Ibid. p118)) summons or turn (of military service) (stemn or stefn (Ibid. p320).
14. Fleet (Clark Hall J R (2000) Ibid. p295).
15. Punitive (naval) foray (Abels R ‘Alfred the Great, the micel hæðen here and the viking threat’ in Reuter T [Ed.] ‘Alfred the Great’ Ashgate (2003) p 278).
16. Here I am using the term ‘Viking’ as shorthand for the raiding and settlement activities of individuals and groups of Scandinavian origin. The origin of the word ‘Viking’ is discussed by Brøndsted J ‘The Vikings’ Penguin Books (1960) p36 – 39. More recently concern has been raised as to the extent to which a complex reality is being hidden by simplistic labels Svanberg F ‘Decolonizing the Viking Age 1’ Acta Archaeologica Lundensia Series in 8o No 43 (2003). A framework for a deeper understanding of this reality in the military context has been discussed by Price N S ‘The Viking Way: Religion and War in Late Iron Age Scandinavia’ Aun 31 Uppsala 2nd Edition (2003) p25-48.
17. Halsall G ‘Anthropology and the Study of Pre-Conquest Warfare and Society: The Ritual War in Anglo-Saxon England’ in Chadwick Hawkes S [Ed.] ‘Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England’ Oxford University Committee for Archaeology Monograph No. 21 (1989) p162.
18. Halsall G (1989) Ibid. pp163.
19. Halsall G (1989) Ibid. p161.
20. Halsall G (1989) Ibid. p164 & p167.
21. For example the raiding by Guthlac in his youth (Felix’s ‘Life of Guthlac’), Halsall G (1989) Ibid. p160 & p165.
22. The earliest example of the offer of Geld, hostages and the swearing of oaths occurred in 655 during the conflict between Oswy and Penda, Halsall G (1989) Ibid. pp164.
23. Clark Hall J R (2000) Ibid. p118 p144 & p179, Halsall G (1989) Ibid. p175 and Abels R (2003) Ibid. pp266.
24. The sea going potential of Viking ships has been widely praised, for example Brøndsted J (1960) Ibid. pp139 - 147. The value of the strategic mobility which the ships offered has also been extensively commented upon, for example Marcus G J 'The Conquest of the North Atlantic' The Boydell Press (1980) p100 - 118 and Griffith P 'The Viking Art of War' Greenhill Books (London) 1995 p73-98.
25. I refer here more to the activity of the micel hæðen here than that of subsequent raiders. It may however be noted that as late as 1055 the outlawed Mercian Earl Ælfgar led a great band which burned the Minster in Hereford … and seized all the treasures (Swanton M [Trans. and Ed.] 'The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles: The Worcester Manuscript (D)' (ASC D) 1055 p185 and p187).
26. Alfred lamented the former wealth of the monasteries in his introduction to Gregory's Pastoral Care Keynes S and Lapidge M (1983) Ibid. p125.
27. In a charter of 875 King Ceowulf of Mercia freed the diocese of Hwicce from the feeding of the King's horses (Sawyer 215). If royal horses were more generally kept at religious establishments it would explain another part of their attraction to the [Vikings], Davies R H C 'Did the Anglo-Saxons have Warhorses ?' in Chadwick Hawkes S [Ed.] 'Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England' Oxford University Committee for Archaeology Monograph No. 21 (1989) p142. The other known source of good quality horses were the stud farms mentioned in C10th wills Davies D H C (1989) Ibid. p142, and implied by earlier place names E.g. Horsham.
28. Prior to the Viking raids and settlement, while forces raided and harried, the time that they spent in each other's territory was likely to have been limited by the time for which they were called up. Following the Berkshire Domesday this may have been in the order of two months, Abels R P 'Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England' British Museum Publications (1988) p99. Encounters often took place in border locations such as fords, Halsall G (1989) Ibid. p166. Smaller raids may have been limited to border areas by an extensive series of burgh tentatively identified for both Wessex and Mercia from as early as 650 AD by Gelling M 'The Place-Name Burton and Variants' in Chadwick Hawkes S [Ed.] 'Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England' Oxford University Committee for Archaeology Monograph No. 21 (1989) p145-153. By contrast Viking armies over wintered, often without formal agreement as to how they gained their food, and on occasion continued to raid even when such agreement was in place (E.g. Swanton M (2000) ASC E 1013).
29. Prior to the Viking raids campaigns typically involved no more than a single battle Halsall G (1989) Ibid. p162, and their frequency may have been limited by limitations placed upon the King by his councillors, similar to those exercised by the Welsh in the Laws of Hywel Dda, Halsall G (1989) Ibid. p164. In contrast, the Vikings arrived and battled until they won, were defeated, or had plunder sufficient that they decided to leave. An extreme example of the intensity of war against the Vikings is provided by the '9 national fights fought against the raiding-army in the kingdom to the south of the Thames' Swanton M (2000) ASC A 870 p72.
30. Alfred Smyth asked 'How … did a 'Great Army' of Danes succeed in accomplishing in eleven or thirteen years what the most able English warlords failed to accomplish in over three centuries? This simple but grim reminder of overwhelming Danish military superiority has rarely if ever been acknowledged by historians.' Making reference to how two kingdoms were taken over (Northumbria and East Anglia), a third was divided in two (Mercia), and a fourth (Wessex) was bought to the brink of defeat. Smyth A P 'The effect of Scandinavian raiders on the English and Irish Churches: a preliminary reassessment' in Smith B [Ed.] 'Britain and Ireland 900 - 1300: Insular Responses to Medieval European Change' Cambridge (1999) p2.
31. Campbell J 'The Anglo-Saxon State' London (2000) pp180, also Abels R ''From Alfred to Harold II: The military failure of the Late Anglo-Saxon State' in Abels R P & Bachrach B S [Eds.] 'The Normans and their Adversaries at War' The Boydell Press (2001) p22 & p30.
32. Great ((micel) Clark Hall J R (2000) Ibid. p235) Heathen ((hæðen) Ibid. p166)) raiding force (here (Ibid. p179).
33. Where they were besieged,Swanton M (2000) ASC A 878 p76.
34. Swanton M (2000) ASC A 878 p74.
35. In this regard it may be noted that in mythological terms Oðinn may be regarded as having withdrawn his support (Price N (2002) Ibid. p96). Yet, rather than welcoming Guthram and his warriors to Valhalla they appeared doomed to the ignominy of Hel's domain, Price N (2002) Ibid. p50.
36. Asser Chapter 56, Keynes S and Lapidge M (1983) Ibid. p85.
37. Asser Chapter 56, Keynes S and Lapidge M (1983) Ibid. p85.
38. Key features to note of this peace are that Guthram had been abandoned by his gods, and in compassion Alfred had bought him to baptism in the name of the Christian Saviour, as his own adoptive son. In doing so, Alfred not only welcomed Guthram into the family of European Kingship but also enabled him to complete the mythological quest of the Viking war leader by taking land, Ellis Davidson H 'The Training of Warriors' in Chadwick Hawkes S [Ed.] 'Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England' Oxford University Committee for Archaeology Monograph No. 21 (1989) p18.
39. While being aware of the dating arguments for this treaty put forwards by Dumville D N 'Wessex and England from Alfred to Edgar' (Studies in Anglo-Saxon History V, general editor Dumville D N) Woodbridge (1992) p1-p27, and the evidence for the history of London in Keynes S 'King Alfred and the Mercians' in Blkackburn M A S & Dumville D N [Eds.] 'Kings, currency and Alliances: History of coinage of Southern England in the Ninth Century (Studies in Anglo-Saxon History IX, general editor Dumville D N) Woodbridge (1998) p1-p45, I prefer the dating suggested by Keynes S and Lapidge M (1983) Ibid. p171, namely 886.
40. 'The treaty between Alfred and Guthram' Keynes S and Lapidge M (1983) Ibid. pp171.
41. Dating following Whitlock D 'English Historical Documents Vol. 1 c. 500-1042' 2nd Edition Eyre Methuen London (1979) p437.
42. Of particular interest amongst the measures in this treaty is the first recorded recognition that the past must be let go for peace to work. 'Concerning all the slaughter and all the harrying and all the injuries which were committed before the truce was established, all of them are to be dismissed, and no one is to avenge it or to ask for compensation' (Whitlock D (1979) Ibid. p439).
43. Ellis Davidson H (1989) Ibid. p14, also Halsall G (1989) Ibid. p161.
44. Ellis Davidson H (1989) Ibid. pp15.
45. The Law codes, II Æthelstan 1 (Attenborough F L [Trans. & Ed.] 'The Laws of the Earliest English Kings' (1922) pp126) and VI Æthelstan 12 (Attenborough F L (1922) ibid. pp168) show a conscious targeting of the 'crimes' of youth which had previously been accepted as a key part of a young warrior's learning.
46. Hooper N 'The Anglo-Saxons at War' in Chadwick Hawkes S [Ed.] 'Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England' Oxford University Committee for Archaeology Monograph No. 21 (1989) p196.
47. Asser Chapters 62, 63, 65, 66 & 69 Keynes S and Lapidge M (1983) Ibid. pp86.
48. Asser Chapter 91 Keynes S and Lapidge M (1983) Ibid. pp101.
49. Lavelle R 'Fortifications in Wessex c. 800-1066' Fortress 14 Osprey Publishing (2003) p28 &p47.
50. Lavelle R 'Fortifications in Wessex c. 800-1066' Fortress 14 Osprey Publishing (2003) p26.
51. Consider for example the call out of troops 'from every stronghold east of the Parret, both west and east of Selwood, and also north of the Thames and west of the Severn' Swanton M (2000) ASC A 893 p87 or the ' great tribe [that] gathered together in King Edward's domain, from the nearest strongholds' Swanton M (2000) ASC A 917 p102.
52. Hill D 'The Calculation and the purpose of the Burghal Hidage' in 'The defence of Wessex: The Burghal Hideage and Anglo-Saxon fortifications' Hill D and Rumble A R [Eds.] p 96.
53. Consider for example the construction of Burh at Towcester, Huntingdon & Colchester and the subsequent submission of the local people, Swanton M (2000) ASC A 917 pp102.
54. Consider for example the construction of Burh at Stamford in 918 , Swanton M (2000) ASC A 918 p103.
55. Wilkinson D R P 'Excavations at 24A St Michael's street 1985' in 'Oxford before the University: The late Saxon and Norman Archaeology of the Thames Crossing, the defences and the town' Dodd A [Ed.] (2003) pp150.
56. For example Towcester, Swanton M (2000) ASC A 917 p102, and the archaeological evidence from Hereford, Cricklade, Lydford, and at least one part of the circuit at Oxford (Wilkinson D R P (2003) ibid. pp150. At Wallingford and Wareham a stone wall was built on the crest of the rampart ibid. p150.
57. Abels R 'English Tactics & Military Organization in the late Tenth Century' in 'The Battle of Maldon AD 991' Scagg D [Ed.] (1991) p144 referring to the work of Halsam J 'Early Medieval Towns in Britain 700 - 1140' (1985) p50. p144.
58. Such as Guthlo Manor, Abels R P (1988) Ibid. p92, Aldsworth F G ''The Mound' at Church Norton, Selsey, and the Site of St. Wilfrid's Church' Sussex Archaeological Collections Volume 117 (1979) p103 - 106, and Holden E W 'Excavations at Old Erringham, Shoreham, West Sussex Pt II The 'Chapel' and Ringwork' Sussex Archaeological Collections Volume 118 (1980) p257 - 297.
59. Swanton M (2000) ASC C 1055 p186.
60. Brooks N 'The Development of Military Obligations in Eighth and Ninth Century England' in Brooks N 'Communities and Warfare 700 - 1400' (2000) p 32 - 47.
61. The charters are in general in Latin, but the Anglo-Saxon equivalents have been used here for consistency with usage in the rest of this essay.
62. Clause 65 in Whitlock D 'Extracts from the Laws of Cnut (1020 - 1023)' in 'English Historical Documents Volume 1 c. 500-1042 2nd Edition (1979) p464.
63. Brooks N (2000) Ibid. p 35.
64. Brooks N 'European Medieval Bridges' in Brooks N 'Communities and Warfare 700 - 1400' (2000) p 21.
65. Brooks N (2000) Ibid. p.35.
66. Brooks N 'Rochester Bridge, AD 43-1381' in Brooks N 'Communities and Warfare 700 - 1400' (2000) p 239.
67. Documentary evidence strongly implies the existence of bridges at Rochester, Cambridge, Chester and Worcester, while archaeology confirms the existence of London Bridge and the bridge on the London Derby road over the Trent (Brooks N (2000) ibid. p21 & p35). Circumstantial evidence suggests the existence of a bridge by Sashes burh where the old Roman road crosses the Thames by Cookham Minster (Brooks N 'The Unidentified Forts of the Burghal Hidage' in Brooks N 'Communities and Warfare 700 - 1400' (2000) p 100). While there appears to have been an earlier bridge at Oxford, archaeology suggests that it was replaced by a ford in late Saxon times (Robinson M 'The paleohydrology of the St Aldgate's area of Oxford in relation to archaeology and the Thames crossing' in 'Oxford before the University: The late Saxon and Norman Archaeology of the Thames Crossing, the defences and the town' Dodd A [Ed.] (2003) p75 & p79-p81.
68. Brooks N (2000) Ibid. p35.
69. Abels R P (1988) Ibid. p72.
70. Swanton M (2000) ASC A 895 p89.
71. Swanton M (2000) ASC E 1016 p149.
72. Abels (1991) Ibid. p144.
73. Abels (1991) Ibid. p147.
74. Consider for example the victory of the burgware of Chichester in Swanton M (2000) ASC A 894 p88 in the context of the 'king's ðegn who were occupying the fortifications' Swanton M (2000) ASC A 893 p87.
75. 'there was no head man who wanted to gather an army' Swanton M (2000) ASC E 1010 pp140.
76. Abels estimated that in the time of Alfred, the demands of providing the burgware may have impacted on 6% of the kingdom's total population (Abels R 'English logistics and military administration, 871-1066: The impact of the Viking wars ' in 'Military Aspects of Scandinavian Society: In a European Perspective AD 1-1300' Nørgård Jørgensen A & Clausen B L (1997) p261).
77. It has been estimated that to raise troops openly could take 2 - 3 weeks, and to do it in secret 3 - 7 weeks, Hooper N 'The Anglo-Saxons at War' in Chadwick Hawkes S [Ed.] 'Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England' Oxford University Committee for Archaeology Monograph No. 21 (1989) pp192.
78. Consider for example the uncontrolled fear evident in the retching and vomiting of Ealdorman Ælfric as he attempted to lead the fyrd of Wiltshire and Hampshire against the Vikings, such that those who were led were not resolute, and all dispersed, Swanton M (2000) ASC E 1003 p135.
79. Swanton M (2000) ASC E 1008 p138.
80. Consider for example the much improved performance of Anglo-Saxon troops under Edmund Ironside, Swanton M (2000) ASC F 1016 p148 p150 p153.
81. Campbell J 'Agents and Agencies of the Late Anglo-Saxon State' in Campbell J 'The Anglo-Saxon State' (2000) p205.
82. Hooper N (1989) Ibid. p193.
83. Hooper N (1989) Ibid. p198.
84. Rodger N A M 'The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain' Volume One 660-1649 (1997) p7 and Swanton M (2000) ASC E 850 p65.
85. Rodger N A M (1997) Ibid. p4.
86. Gifford E & Gifford J 'Alfred's new longships' in 'Alfred the Great' [Ed.] Reuter T (2003) p281- 289.
87. Abels R (1988) pp109 & Abels R (1991) Ibid. p145.
88. Rodger N A M (1997) Ibid. p10 & pp21.
89. Rodger N A M (1997) Ibid. p4.
90. Rodger N A M (1997) Ibid. pp18 & Hooper N (1989) Ibid. p198.
91. Abels R (1988) Ibid. p180 & Hooper N (1989) Ibid. p198.
92. Rodger N A M (1997) Ibid. pp19.
93. See note 15.
94. Abels R (1988) Ibid. p180.
95. Rodger N A M (1997) Ibid. pp32.
96. Swanton M (2000) ASC D 1066 p199.
97. Asser Chapter 91 Keynes S and Lapidge M (1983) Ibid. p101.
98. William of Poitiers 'Gesta Willelmi' in 'The Battle of Hastings' [Ed.] Morillo S (1996) p14.
99. Florence of Worcester 'Chronicon ex Chronicis' in 'The Battle of Hastings' [Ed.] Morillo S (1996) p31.
100. Hooper notes how few battles successful warrior kings choose to fight, Hooper N (1989) Ibid. p197.
101. See note 2.
102. See notes 48, 49, 50, 51, 65 & 72.
103. See note 31.
104. Consider in this light 'The edict when the "Great Army" came to England (VII Ethelred [Sic.], probably 1009' in Whitlock D 'English Historical Documents Volume 1 c. 500-1042 2nd Edition (1979) p464.p447-p448.
105. See note 80.
106. See note 83.
107. See note 97.
108. See note 38.
109. Consider for example notes 28 & 60.
110. See note 88.
111. Hooper N (1989) Ibid. p197.
112. See notes 75, 76, 77 & 78.
113. See notes 91 & 94.
114. Abels (2001) Ibid. p29.

References

Paul Glover

paul-glover@blueyonder.co.uk

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